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Report of the Task Force on Rule 102 (e)
Proceedings: Rule 102(e) Sanctions Against
Accountants
By the Task Force on Rule 1 02(e) Proceedings*

INTRODUCTION
Under Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice, 1 the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Commission) may sanction accountants, lawyers,
and other professionals who "practice before the Commission. "2 If the
Commission provides the professional with notice and the opportunity for
a hearing, it can sanction that professional on a determination that the
professional engaged in what the rule describes as "improper professional
conduct. " 3
*The Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities (Committee) of the American Bar
Association's Section of Business Law (Section) formed this task force to consider the standards that the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission should apply in imposing a sanction
upon an accountant pursuant to Rule I 02(e). This report sets forth the result of that consideration. The members of the Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings (I'ask Force) are: Dixie
L.Johnson (Co-Chair),John H. Sture (Co-Chair), Kenneth B. Winer (Co-Chair),Jayne W.
Barnard, Evan]. Falchuk,Jeffrey T. Gilleran, Thomas Gorman, David B. Hardison, Gloria
K. Niemi, and Thomas L. Riesenberg.
The Task Force is comprised of members of the Committee's Subcommittee on Civil
Litigation and Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Matters. A draft of this
report was circulated for comment among members of this subcommittee and the chairs and
vice-chairs of the other subcommittees and task forces of the Committee, the officers of the
Committee, the members of the Advisory Committee of the Committee, and the officers of
the Section. A substantial majority of those who have reviewed the Report in draft form have
indicated their general agreement with the views expressed. This report, however, does not
represent the official position of the American Bar Association, the Section, or the Committee, nor does it necessarily reflect the views of all of those who have reviewed it.
I. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1 02(e) (1996). Prior to 1995, the authority was set forth in Rule 2(e) of
the Commission's Rules of Practice, which was substantially identical to the current Rule
I 02(e). For ease of reference, this report refers to Rule I 02(e) even when the rule in effect at
the time of the precedents described was Rule 2(e).
2. While there has been substantial controversy surrounding the imposition of Rule 102(e)
sanctions against lawyers, the American Bar Association has previously articulated its position
with regard to lawyers. This report is not intended to address the imposition of Rule 102(e)
sanctions against lawyers, and should not be read to suggest that its premises, analysis, or
recommendation apply to the imposition of Rule I 02(e) sanctions against lawyers.
3. 17 C.F.R. §201.102(e).
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Although Rule I 02(e) is now in its seventh decade of existence, the
criteria used by the Commission in determining what constitutes "improper professional conduct" remain far from well-defined. 4 Concerns relating to the sanctioning of accountants have become particularly acute
since the Commission's 1992 opinion in In re Checkosky (Checkosky !), in
which the Commission indicated that a negligent failure to adhere to auditing standards constituted improper professional conduct.5 Following an
appeal of that decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
ordered the Commission to identify its standards for the imposition ofRule
102(e) sanctions, to clarify whether its position was that negligent conduct
could give rise to 102(e) sanctions.6
The Commission's response, however, issued in itsjanuary 1997 In re
4. This ambiguity has caused much debate and controversy. See, e.g., Judah Best, In Opposition to Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 36 Bus. LAw. 1815 (1981); Robert A. Downing & Richard L.
Miller, Jr., The Distortion ar1d Misuse !![Rule 2(e) , 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 774 (1979); Ralph C .
Ferrara, Administrative Disciplirwry Proceedings U11der Rule 2(e), 36 Bus. LAw. 1807 ( 1981 ); Daniel
L. Goelzer, The SEC and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in the Changing Regulation if the Accounting
Prqfession, 52 BROOK. L. REV. I 05 7 ( 1987); Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule
2(e): Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline if Prifessiollals, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 652 (1991);
Roberta S. Karmel, A Delicate Assignment: The Regulation if Accou11tants by the SEC, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV . 959 ( 1981 ); Michael R . Lanzarone, Prifessional Discipline: Unfairness and Indficiency in the
Administrative Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 818 (1983); Philip H . Levy, Regulation if the Accounting Prifessiorl Through Rule 2 (e) if the SEC's Rules if Practice: Valid or Invalid Exercise if Power?,
46 BROOK. L. REV. 1159 (1980); Harold Marsh,Jr., Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAw. 987
( 1980); Christine Neylon O'Brien, SEC Regulation if the Accounting Prifession: Rule 2(e), 21 GONZ.
L. R EV. 675 (1985); Quinton E Seamons, Inside the Labyrinth if the Elusive Standard Under tlze
SEC's Rule 2(e), 23 SEC. REG. LJ. 57 (1995); George J. Siedel, Rule 2(e) and Corporate Officers,
39 Bus. LAw. 455 ( 1984); Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, Tlze Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate
America's Search for tlze Perftct Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REV. I 077 ( 1987); James R. Doty et al. ,
The Prifessional as Difendant, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTI' ON SECURITIES REGULATION 681
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 84-6978, 1991 ); Michael]. Crane,
Note, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Accountants: Tlze Need for a More Ascertainable Improper Prqfessional Conduct Standard in the SEC's Rule 2(e), 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 351 (1984).
5. In re Checkosky (Checkosky 1), Exchange Act Release No. 31,094, 52 S.E.C . Docket
(CCH) 1122, 1133 (Aug. 26, 1992). As will be set forth in more detail , in Checkosky I, two
accountants had argued, among other things, that a finding of improper professional conduct
could only be made where there was willful misconduct of the sort that would constitute
scimter under§ l O(b) and Rule I Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
15 U.S. C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.ER. § 240.1Ob-5 (1996). Noting that it could sanction accounta nts under Rule I 02(e) in the absence of scienter, the Commission found that the two
accountants had acted recklessly and imposed Rule 102(e) sanctions on them. Checkosky I, 52
S.E.C . Docket (CCH) at 1132-33.
6. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 E3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A panel of judges of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued three separate opinions, evidencing the lack of
judicial consensus as to the propriety of the Commission's current use of Rule I 02(e). Because
two judges believed the Commission either had not articulated the standa rd of culpability
applicable to Rule I02(e) proceedings, or had not explained why the standard adopted applied to the accountants ' conduct, the case was remanded to the Commission for a "more
adequate explanation of its interpretation of Rule 2(e)(l)(ii) and its application to this case. "
/d. (per curiam).
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Checkosky opinion (Checkosky If), provides little clarification. 7 Instead of identifying a threshold mental state for the imposition of sanctions on accountants, two commissioners, acting as a majority, stated that Rule I 02(e) "does
not mandate a particular mental state."8 Moreover, instead of clarifying
whether or not negligent conduct alone provides a sufficient basis for the
imposition of sanctions under Rule l02(e), the Commission maintained
that "negligent actions by a professional may, under certain circumstances,
constitute improper professional conduct. "9
Because the Commission declined to identify these "certain circumstances," the Task Force believes that the Commission should undertake
a reappraisal of the standards it will apply in determining what constitutes
"improper professional conduct" by an accountant. The Task Force believes that, in light of a number of factors, including the extraordinary
impact of Rule l 02( e) sanctions, as well as the standards applicable to the
imposition of similar sanctions in other contexts, the Commission should
impose Rule 102(e) sanctions only where an accountant's prior activities,
considered together with the accountant's current circumstances, demonstrate that he or she is presently substantially unfit to appear and practice before the Commission, and, therefore, poses a current threat to the
Commission's processes.
Part I of this report provides a brief overview of the provisions of Rule
102(e), as well as the historical bases for the imposition of sanctions under
the rule. Part II considers the limitations on the Commission's authority
to impose Rule 102(e) sanctions. Part III examines the Commission's conception of what constitutes improper professional conduct by an accountant as announced in its recent Checkosky II opinion. Part IV discusses the
standards applicable to other situations in which the Commission seeks to
restrict the ability of an individual to participate in a particular business
or profession. Part V surveys the other authorities that regulate the professionalism of licensed accountants. Part VI summarizes this report and
sets forth the Task Force's recommendation.

OVERVIEW OF RULE 102(e)
PROVISIONS OF THE RULE
Rule l 02(e) is currently comprised of three main provisions, the relevant
text of which follows:
7. In re Checkosky (Checkosky If), Exchange Act Release No. 38,183, 63 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 1691 (Jan. 21, 1997). It should be noted that the Commission did not respond to the
D.C. Circuit's directive until January 1997, more than two and one-half years after it was
given and more than 15 years after some of the facts underlying the proceeding occurred.
8. Checkosky lf, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1700. As will be discussed more thoroughly,
Commissioner johnson issued a dissenting opinion in which he stated that the Commission
"should not hold a professional liable for improper professional conduct under Rule 2(e)( I)(ii),
absent a finding of scienter." /d. at 1705 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
9. /d. at I 700. The respondents, Messrs. Checkosky and Aldritch, have since filed a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C . Circuit. Checkosky v. SEC, No.
97-1137(D.C. Cir.filedMar. 17, 1997).
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(e) Suspension and disbarment. (I) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege
of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who
is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others;
or
(ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in
unethical or improper professional conduct; or
(iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the
rules and regulations thereunder.
(2) Certain prqfessionals and convicted persons. Any attorney who has been
suspended or disbarred by a court of the United States or of any
State; or any person whose license to practice as an accountant,
engineer, or other professional or expert has been revoked or suspended in any State; or any person who has been convicted of a
felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude shall be forthwith suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission ....
(3) Temporary suspensions.
(i) The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and
without preliminary hearing, may, by order, temporarily suspend from appearing or practicing before it any attorney,
accountant, engineer, or other professional or expert who has
been by name:
(A) Permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction, by reason of his or her misconduct in an action
brought by the Commission, from violating or aiding and
abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or of the rules and regulations thereunder;
or
(B) Found by any court of competent jurisdiction in an action
brought by the Commission to which he or she is a party
... to have violated (unless the violation was found not
to have been willful) or aided and abetted the violation
of any provision of the Federal securities laws or of the
rules and regulations thereunder. 10
I 0. I 7 C .ER. § 201 .102(e). Although the rule is currently comprised of three parts, when
it was originally adopted in 1935, the sole provision was the current Rule 102(e)(l). Rules
102(e)(2) and 102(e)(3), whereby the Commission may automatically temporarily suspend a
professional without notice or a hearing, were added to th e Rules of Practice as part of a
series of amendments adopted in 1970.
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As previously indicated, Rule 102(e)(l)(ii), pursuant to which the Commission may impose sanctions where it determines a professional has engaged in "improper professional conduct," is the focus of this report.

IMPACT OF A RULE 102(e) SANCTION
A Rule 102(e) sanction restricts an accountant's ability to "practice before the Commission." Since at least 1938, when the Commission issued
its first definition of the concept of "practice before the Commission," its
interpretation of the activities constituting "practice before the Commission" has been broad and inclusive." Under Rule 102(D, "practice before
the Commission" includes, but is not limited to:
( 1) Transacting any business with the Commission; and
(2) The preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any
attorney, accountant, engineer, or other professional or expert,
filed with the Commission in any registration statement, notification, application, report or other document with the consent of
such attorney, accountant, engineer or other professional or expert.12
A suspension or bar from practice before the Commission has severe effects
on an accountant; almost all of his or her work involving a public company,
whether undertaken as an internal or independent accountant or auditor,
becomes prohibited conduct. The Commission repeatedly has indicated
that practice before the Commission as an accountant includes the preparation and review of financial statements, and the assumption of responsibility (when functioning as an accountant) for their preparation and review, !3 as well as the issuance of audit reports. Under these circumstances,
suspending or barring an accountant from practice before the Commission
frequently has the practical effect of making it impossible for the account-

II. Although the phrase "practice before the Commission" first appeared in Rule II of
the Commission's original Rules of Practice, adopted September 13, 1935, see FIRST ANN.
REP. Of THE SECS. & EXCH. COMM'N 45-46 (1935), the Commission first defin ed this phrase
in a 1938 revision of its Rules of Practice. See 3 Fed. Reg. 1584 (1938).
12. 17 C .F.R. §201.102(Q.
13. In a number of orders imposing Rule I 02(e) sanctions against accountants, the Commission has provided that the accountant may, after a designated period of time, apply to
resume appearing and practicing before the Commission as a preparer or reviewer of financial statements required to be filed with the Commission, or a person responsible for the
preparation or review of financial statements required to be filed with the Commission. See,
e.g., In re Ferraro, Exchange Act Release No. 37,474, 62 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1040 Guly 24,
1996); In re Stern, Exchange Act Release No. 36,382, 60 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1272 (Oct.
17, 1995); In re Hoffman, Exchange Act Release No. 33,409, 55 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 2174,
2175 Gan. 4, 1994); In re Schiemann, Exchange Act Release No. 32,983, 55 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 225, 230 (Sept. 29, 1993).
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ant to work as a public accountant. 14 Although the Commission, in its
discretion, may merely censure an accountant rather than impose a bar
or suspension, a censure may carry with it collateral consequences that
have the same general characteristics as those experienced by accountants
who are suspended from practice before the Commission.

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A RULE I 02(e)
SANCTION
Aside from the direct effects on an accountant's ability to pursue his or
her profession during the period of the suspension, a Rule 102(e) sanction
often has significant collateral consequences. 15 A Rule 102(e) proceeding
often is accompanied by publicity that can have an adverse impact on the
accountant's reputation. 16 Employers might hesitate to employ or promote
individuals who have been the subject of a Rule 102(e) sanction. Where
the accountant is an employee, officer, or director of a public company,
the company might be advised to disclose such a sanction. 17 Indeed, before

14. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (opinion of Randolph,
CJ.) (stating a proceeding under Rule 2(e) threatens " 'to deprive a person of a way of life
to which he has devoted years of preparation and on which he and his family have come to
rely'" (quoting Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind qf Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1297
(1975)).
15. Cjjohnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484,488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that a Commission
order which censured a registered representative and suspended her for six months from
acting as a supervisor "not only restricted [her] ability to earn a living as a supervisor during
her six-month suspension, but ... was also likely to have longer-lasting repercussions on her
ability to pursue her vocation").
16. This has become a much greater concern since the 1988 amendments to Rule 102(e),
which reversed the Commission's prior practice by providing that the initiation of all subsequent Rule 102(e) proceedings would be made public unless the Commission otherwise
ordered. See Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing before
the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 25,893, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) '\[84,248, at 89,238 Guly 7, 1988) [hereinafter Disciplinary Proceedings Release].
17. In 1994, in a release announcing proposed amendments to its rules "that would expand the types of legal proceedings required to be disclosed in Commission filings," the
Commission solicited comment as to whether Commission registrants should be required to
disclose all Rule 102(e) proceedings initiated by the Commission against, among others, any
of the registrant's executive officers, directors, and persons nominated to become directors.
Disclosure Concerning Legal Proceedings Involving Management, Promoters, Control Persons and Others, Securities Act Release No. 7106, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,385 (1994). Although the
Commission has not adopted the proposed rules, in the release it indicated that certain Rule
l02(e) proceedings should be disclosed:
Where Rule 2(e) orders relate to violations of the federal securities laws, disclosure would
be required under both the current and proposed rules. Should the requirements be
expanded to encompass Rule 2(e) orders based on lack of professional qualifications,
lack of character or integrity, or unethical or improper professional misconduct, the
conviction of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or the disbarment
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accepting a public company as an audit client, accounting firms almost
certainly consider the circumstances of any Rule l02(e) sanction against
the company's senior personnel. Similarly, an underwriter is likely to consider the circumstances of any Rule l 02(e) sanction against the company's
senior personnel before agreeing to underwrite an offering of the company's securities. Further, the NASDAQ Stock Market and the stock exchanges might consider the circumstances surrounding a Rule l02(e) sanction against a company's senior personnel in deciding whether to list the
company's securities.

AUTHORIZED RULE 102(e) SANCTIONS SERVE ONLY
REMEDIAL PURPOSES
Although none of the federal securities statutes expressly authorize the
Commission to censure, suspend, or disbar professionals from practice
before the Commission, four federal courts of appeal have specifically upheld the Commission's authority to promulgate Rule l 02(e) as "reasonably
related" to the purposes of the federal securities laws. 18 Each of these
courts has held, however, that the Commission's authority to impose sanctions under Rule l 02(e) is limited by the principle that the sanctions may
be imposed for the sole purpose of prospectively protecting the Commission's processes. 19 Stated differently, Rule 102(e) sanctions must serve only
a remedial, not punitive, purpose.
While the distinction between "punitive" and "remedial" sanctions has
or revocation of a license to practice as an attorney, accountant, engineer or other
expert?
!d. at 55,391 (footnotes omitted).
18. Sheldon v. SEC, 45 F.3d 1515, 1518 (lith Cir. 1995) (stating "[w)ejoin the Second
and Ninth Circuits in rejecting the contention that the SEC's Rule 2(e) is improper"); Checkosky, 23 F. 3d at 455 (opinion of Silberman, CJ.) (adopting reasoning of the Second and
Ninth Circuits); Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding "(t] he authority
of the SEC to discipline accountants and bar them from practice before the Commission
under Rule 2(e) was expressly upheld in a thorough opinion by Judge Timbers of the Second
Circuit, whose reasoning we adopt") (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d
Cir. 1979)); Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 582 (stating Rule I 02(e) " provides the Commission
with the means to ensure that those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily
in the performance of its statutory duties, perform their tasks diligently and with a reasonable
degree of competence. As such the Rule is 'reasonably related' to the purposes of the securities
laws") (citing Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973)).
19. Sheldon, 45 F. 3d at 1518 (adopting the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits);
Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456 (noting "[t)he Commission had promulgated Rule 2(e) not to augment its enforcement arsenal but to protect its administrative processes, and the court correctly recognized that the Commission may not 'usurp the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to deal with "violations" of the securities laws' ") (quoting Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at
5 79)) (opinion of Silberman, CJ.); Davy, 792 F.2d at 1421 (adopting reasoning of Second
Circuit in Touche Ross & Co.); Touche Ross & Co., 609 F.2d at 582 (finding "Rule 2(e) . . .
represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integrity of its own processes").
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been the topic of some debate in the courts, the Commission recently
argued, in the context of an appeal of a broker-dealer disciplinary proceeding, that the test for determining whether a particular sanction is
punitive or remedial is whether the sanction is for "the purpose of punishing past misconduct" or "is based on present unfitness."2° In the context
of Rule I 02(e) proceedings, the Commission and the federal courts have
articulated the same standard, consistently maintaining that the imposition
of Rule 102(e) sanctions is based on a determination that a professional's
conduct demonstrates that he or she presents a current threat to the integrity of the Commission's processes:2 1
Rule 2(e) proceedings are designed not to punish a person, but to
protect the integrity of Commission proceedings. In keeping with this
purpose, the sanctions imposed in a Rule 2(e) proceeding should be
limited to those sanctions necessary to protect the Commission's proceedings, such as suspensions or bars from appearing before the Commission.22

20. Brief of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent, Johnson v. SEC,
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 1996) (No. 95-1340) [hereinafter SEC Brie8.
21 . See, e.g., Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, reprinted in Securities Law E1iforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 1/!lecommunications and Fin. qf the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce
on H.R. 9 75, 10 I st Con g. I st Sess. 48-49 ( 1989) [hereinafter Commission Memorandum];
Checkosky, 23 F. 3d at 493 (stating that "(t]he Commission has the authority to issue Rule 2(e)
in order to 'protect the integrity of its own processes' (e.g. to assure honest and accurate
financial filings) by revoking the privileges of professionals whose conduct threatens those
processes") (Reynolds, DJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Touche Ross & Co., 609
F.2d at 5 79 (stating that the purpose of Rule I 02(e) is "to preserve the integrity of its own
procedures, by assuring the fitness of those professionals who represent others before the
Commission"); see also Davy, 792 F.2d at 1421.
22. Commission Memorandum, supra note 21, at 49. At the time the Commission submitted its memorandum, Congress was considering the possibility of expanding the Commission's authority under Rule 102(e) by granting it the ability to impose civil monetary
penalties in such proceedings. In the memorandum, the Commission specifically argued
against the opportunity, stating: "[p]aying a penalty will not make a professional fit to practice
before the commission. Rather, penalties serve enforcement goals of punishing past misconduct and deterring future misconduct." /d.; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989). In Halper, a case relating to the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibition on multiple
punishments, the U.S. Supreme Court observed:
[T]he determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes
th at the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal
sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case
serves the goals of punishment.
These goals are familiar. We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves
the twin aims of retribution and deterrence .... From these premises, it follows that a
civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
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To this end, the federal courts and the Commission have emphasized that
Rule l02(e) is not an additional weapon in the Commission's enforcement
arsenal, but is rather a means of protecting the Commission's processes if
a professional's prior activities demonstrate he or she poses a current threat
to those processes. 23

RECENT RULE 102(e) PROCEEDINGS
The Task Force shares the views of the federal courts and the Commission that Rule l02(e) sanctions should serve solely a remedial purpose.
The Task Force believes, however, that the lack of clearly defined standards
for what constitutes improper professional conduct has, in many cases, led
to the inappropriate employment of Rule l02(e) to punish prior alleged
failures by accountants to comply with professional standards, rather than
to protect the Commission's processes from individuals found to present a
current threat to the integrity of those processes. The Commission's recently issued Checkosky II opinion provides not only a discussion, but also
an example, of the difficulties facing both the Commission and the accounting profession relating to the proper use of Rule l 02(e).

IN RE CHECKOSKY
In the Commission's opinion in Checkosky I, 24 which preceded the court
of appeals decision previously described, the Commission found that
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.
!d. at 448. Thus, because authorized Rule 102(e) sanctions must serve only a remedial purpose, a Rule 102(e) sanction may not also carry a retributive or deterrent purpose. The Task
Force recognizes, however, that, even without a deterrent purpose, the imposition of a Rule
I 02(e) sanction on an individual accountant may have the iffoct of deterring similar conduct
by other accountants. The Task Force does not believe that the mere existence of such a
deterrent effect transforms what would otherwise be a remedial Rule I 02(e) sanction, afortiori,
into a punitive sanction.
23. See, e.g., Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 493 (noting that "Rule 2(e) is separate from the SEC's
arsenal against violations of the Act's substantive provisions, because suspensions under the
Rule are necessary to aid the Commission in the regulation and administration of the Act")
(Reynolds, DJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted); Touche Ross &
Co., 609 F.2d at 579. The Touche Ross & Co. court stated:

[i]ndeed, the Commission has made it clear that its intent in promulgating Rule 2(e)
was not to utilize the rule as an additional weapon in its enforcement arsenal, but rather
to determine whether a person's professional qualifications, including his character and
integrity, are such that he is fit to appear and practice before the Commission.

/d.; if. In re Carter, Securities Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,847, at 84,149 (Feb. 28, 1981) (determining that the purpose of Rule 102(e)
is to "protect the integrity of [the Commission's] processes .... [and not] the creation of new
administrative proceedings to fill gaps in the Commission's current statutory panoply of
remedies").
24. In re Checkosky (Checkosky 1), Exchange Act Release No. 31,094, 52 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 1122 (Aug. 26, 1992).
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"proof of bad faith or willful misconduct is not a prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 2(e)(l)(ii) of the Commission's Rules
of Practice. "25 In Checkosky I, the Commission determined that two auditors had incorrectly interpreted GAAP and had violated GAAS by failing
to: (i) qualify their opinion as to whether the issuer's financial statements
were prepared in accordance with GAAP, (ii) conduct the audit with sufficient skepticism and due care, and (iii) obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support their opinion.2 6 Although the Commission characterized the auditors' conduct as reckless, the Commission asserted, in
finding that the auditors had engaged in "improper professional conduct,"
that "a mental awareness greater than negligence is not required to impose
sanctions against an accountant pursuant to Rule 2(e)." 27
A challenge to the Commission's order ensued. As previously noted, a
panel of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that it was unclear whether the Commission had applied a negligence standard in finding that the auditors had engaged in improper professional conduct.2 8 Indeed, one of the judges indicated that the
Commission's prior Rule l02(e) decisions demonstrated that the Commission had never been clear about what standard of conduct should give
rise to a l02(e) sanction.2 9 Accordingly, the matter was remanded, with
instructions for the Commission to clarify the standard of conduct, and
how it applied to the case. 30
In its response, the majority of the Commission began by reiterating
and explaining its conclusion that the auditors' conduct had been "reckless."31 Thus, a finding as to whether the respondents had been negligent,
and whether negligent conduct alone was a sufficient basis for a finding
of sanctionable improper professional conduct, was unnecessary to a decision in the proceeding. Nevertheless, the Commission took the occasion
to point out that Rule 102(e) is a means by which the Commission holds
" 'those professionals who practice before us to generally recognized norms
25. !d. at 1123.
26. /d. at 1131-32.
27. /d. at 1132 (quoting Carter, (1981 Transfer Binder] .Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,150
(finding a sanction under Rule l02(e) is "limited to that necessary to protect the investing
public and the Commission from the future impact on its processes of professional misconduct")).
28. See supra text accompanying note 6.
29. Chcckosky v. SEC, 23 E3d 452, 462 (stating that the Commission has "variously
indicated that different levels of mental culpability are needed" to make out a Rule 102(e)
violation) (opinion of Silberman, CJ.).
30. /d. at 454 (per curiam).
31. In re Chcckosky (Checkosky II), Exchange Act Release No. 38,183, 63 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 1691, 1696 Qan. 21, 1997). The Commission noted that recklessness has been defined
as "not merely a form of ordinary negligence; it is an 'extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known
to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.'" /d. at 1696
n.23 (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 967 E2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
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of professional conduct.... To do so upsets no justifiable expectations,
since the professional is already subject to those norms.' In the case of
accountants, those standards include GAAS and GAAP." 32 Examining the
conduct of accountants in light of these standards, the Commission stated
that it had, in the past, "found improper professional conduct committed
under circumstances evidencing a variety of mental states. "33 Improper
professional conduct by accountants thus "encompasses a range of conduct,"34 including not just willful acts of malfeasance, but also conduct
that is "incompetent or unethical," 35 even conduct that was the result of
mental and physical exhaustion. 36 Given these precedents, the Commission deduced that "varying degrees of care or mental state" could give rise
to Rule 102(e) sanctions.37
As for the specific question of whether negligent conduct could give rise
to a Rule 102(e) sanction, the Commission conceded that its processes
"are not necessarily threatened by innocent or even certain careless mistakes."38 Indeed, the majority emphasized that it wished to "make clear"
that "the fact that GAAP and GAAS are professional standards against
which we measure the conduct of accountants does not mean that every
deviation from GAAP and GAAS is improper professional conduct warranting discipline" under Rule 102(e).39 Nonetheless, the Commission
warned that Rule 102(e) "does not mandate a particular mental state ...
negligent actions by a professional may, under certain circumstances, constitute improper professional conduct. " 40
The majority deliberately declined to identify the "certain circumstances" of nonreckless or nonintentional conduct that would warrant
sanctions, except to briefly describe several broad areas of deficiency, lack
of independence, misapplication of GAAP, lack of skepticism, lack of factual basis for an opinion, and failure to perform auditing procedures, that
had in the past been instances in which it had imposed sanctions. Indeed,
the majority indicated that, while repeated "mistakes" could give rise to
sanctions, "isolated failures may be so serious as to warrant discipline,"

32. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C . Docket (CCH) at 1699-1700 (footnote omitted) (quoting Carter,
[1981 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84,148).
33. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1699.
34. !d. at 1700 (stating "we have not hesitated to sanction auditors for such conduct").
35. !d. (quoting Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84, 148 (finding
"[a]n incompetent or unethical practitioner has the ability to inflict substantial damage on
the Commission's processes, and thus the investing public") (quoting In re Keating, Muething
& Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) '\182,124, at 81,991 Gu1y 2, 1979) (Williams, Chairman, concurring)).
36. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 170 I .
37. !d.
38. !d. at I 703.
39. !d.
40. !d. at 1700.
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even where the isolated failure is merely "careless and unprofessional." 41
As such, the Commission stated that its "conclusions about the propriety
of particular professional conduct are driven by the impact on Commission
processes of the specific facts presented in a given proceeding before us." 42
Commissioner Johnson filed a separate opinion, dissenting from the
majority's conclusion that accountants could be sanctioned under Rule
I 02(e) " based on conduct that is merely negligent." 4 3 In Commissioner
Johnson's view, the Commission should impose Rule 102(e) sanctions "only
when it is demonstrated that [the professional] acted with scienter." 44 According to Commissioner Johnson:
A professional often must make difficult decisions, navigating through
complex statutory and regulatory requirements, and, in the case of
accountants, complying with [GAAS] and applying [GAAP]. These
determinations require the application of independent professional
judgment and sometimes involve matters of first impression. For this
reason, I believe that an earlier Commission was correct to assert
that, if a professional is to exercise his or her "Best independent judgment . .. [the professional] must have the freedom to make innocent-or even, in certain cases, careless-mistakes without fear of
Qosing] the ability to practice before" us. 4 5
CommissionerJohnson further emphasized that the Commission should
exercise "an appropriate degree" of self restraint: 4 6
I simply do not believe that we should recast negligent violations of
an accounting standard as improper professional conduct. .. . That
41. /d. at l 703. The Commission cited one case intended to support this proposition, In
re Bollt & Shapiro, 38 S.E.C. 815, 823 (1959). Bollt & Shapiro involved a two-partner accounting
firm in which one partner, Shapiro (whose conduct the Commission characterized as " careless and unprofessional"), reported on the financial statements of a client even though the
other partner, Bollt, was the promoter, principal officer, and controlling shareholder of the
client, a clear vi olation of independence rules. In that proceeding, the Commission found
that, even though Shapiro had been concerned about his independence, he relied on the
opinion of the client's lawyer (who was himself an officer and director of the client) that he
was qualified to certify the client's financial statements. Such extreme indifference to independence requirements would seem to constitute reckless conduct, not mere negligence.
42. Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) at 1700.
43. /d. at 1704 (opinion of Johnson , Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Johnson also
questioned the "appropriateness of disciplining the respondents considering the age of this
proceeding. " /d.
44. /d.
45. /d. (quoting In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,847, at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981)) (alterations in original). Commissioner Johnson reiterated the concern expressed in Carter that a negligence standard would
"impair the relationships" between accountants and their clients, and hinder "our system of
truthful and accurate disclosure." /d. (stating that professionals" 'motivated by fears for their
personal liability will not be consulted on difficult issues' ") (quoting Carter, [1981 Transfer
Binder), at 84,167).
46. /d.
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is not an appropriate role for this Commission. Difficult ethical and
professional responsibility concerns are generally matters most appropriately dealt with by professional organizations or, in certain
cases, malpractice litigation. Nor do I believe that mere misjudgments
or negligence establishes either professional incompetence warranting
Commission disciplinary action or the likelihood of future danger to
the Commission's processes.47
As indicated by Commissioner Johnson, the Commission's determination to apply a negligence standard in Rule 102(e) proceedings raises
doubts as to how a negligent auditor, whose conduct has already been
completed, poses a threat to the Commission's processes. The Task Force
believes that the Commission's willingness to rely on an accountant or
auditor's past conduct as the sole basis for the imposition of a Rule l02(e)
sanction presents a potentially serious problem for the continued validity
of Rule I 02(e), particularly where the past conduct is merely negligent.
Indeed, as CircuitJudge Silberman emphasized in his opinion in Checkosky:
If the Commission were to determine that an accountant's negligence
is a per se violation of Rule 2(e), it would have to consider not only
the administrative burden such a position would entail but also
whether it would constitute a de focto substantive regulation of the
profession and thus raise questions as to the legitimacy of Rule
2(e)(l)(ii)-or at least its scope.48
Whether one agrees with the majority's position that state of mind is
not determinative of whether to find improper professional conduct, or
Commissioner Johnson's view that scienter is required, the Task Force believes that the criteria discussed in the Checkosky opinions fail to address
what should be the central focus of a disciplinary proceeding: whether,
taking into account all of the facts concerning a respondent, including his
or her past conduct and current circumstances, the respondent poses a current threat of foture conduct harmful to the Commission's processes. In a
variety of other contexts, the Commission seeks to preclude individuals
who are alleged to have engaged in past misconduct from engaging, in the
future, in particular professional pursuits. The standards articulated as
applicable in determining whether to impose sanctions in these contexts
47. /d. at 1705.
48. Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F. 3d 452, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Such substantive regulation of
the accounting profession by the Commission would run contrary to the clearly stated intent
of Congress, which, more than 30 years ago, stripped the authority of federal agencies to
impose their own admissions standards on professionals practicing before them. See H .R .
REP. No. 89-1141, at 4173 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4170, 4173 (stating that
"there is a presumption that members in good standing of the professions of the law and
certified public accountancy are of good moral character, and that surveillance by State bar
associations and State associations of certified public accounts [sic] will sufficiently insure the
integrity of practice by such persons" ).
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provide a model for the manner in which the Commission should determine whether to impose sanctions in the Rule 102(e) context.

STANDARDS APPLIED BY THE COMMISSION IN
IMPOSING SUSPENSIONS AND BARS IN ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND SEEKING
COURT-ORDERED SUSPENSIONS AND BARS
Under the Exchange Act, the Commission has the authority to suspend
or bar persons from associating with broker-dealers. Similarly, under the
Exchange Act, the Commission has the authority to seek a court-ordered
suspension or bar precluding a person from serving as an officer or director
of a public company for the period of the suspension. In each of these
situations, the Commission or a court is required to determine whether
the person in question presents a current threat to the public, such that a
suspension or bar is necessary to protect the public from future wrongdoing.49
49. Consideration by the Commission of the need to protect the public from the likelihood
of future wrongdoing is not limited to the question of suspensions and bars. The issue has
been analyzed repeatedly by courts in the context of requests for injunctive relief in actions
brought by the Commission. Courts generally award permanent injunctions where the Commission has established a past violation and made a proper showing that "a reasonable
likelihood exists" that future violations would occur absent an injunction. See, e.g., SEC v.
Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 144 (7th Cir. 1982). In determining whether there is a reasonable
likelihood of a recurrence, courts have considered a number of factors including: (i) the
egregiousness of the violations; (ii) the isolated or repeated nature of the violations; (iii) the
degree of scienter involved; (iv) the sincerity of the defendant's assurances, if any, against
future violations; (v) the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct; (vi)
opportunities presented (or lack thereoD by the defendant's occupation for future violations;
(vii) the defendant's age and health; (viii) the time elapsed since the violation; and (ix) the
severe economic and professional consequences that an injunction can have on a defendant.
See, e.g., SEC v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 767, 769 (lOth Cir. 1993); SEC v. Washington
County Uti!. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp.,
546 F.2d l 044, I 048 (2d Cir. 1976). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that,
to establish a likelihood of future misconduct, it will almost always be necessary for the
Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past misconduct was the result of more
than negligence. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 702 (1980) (stating "[t]he Court of
Appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction in this case in the misapprehension that it
was not necessary to find scienter in order to support an injunction under[§ 17(a)(l) of the
1933 Act, § I O(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule I Ob-5 promulgated thereunder]"); see also id. at
703 (Burger,]., concurring) (opining that "[t]o make such a showing, it will almost always be
necessary for the Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the
result of more than negligence").
Although the Commission has asserted, without citation, that "the standards for fraud or
for injunctive relief'have no bearing' on Rule 2(e)(l)(ii) proceedings," Checkosky II, 63 S.E.C.
Docket (CCH) at 1700 n.S I (citing In re Checkosky (Checkosky !), 52 S.E.C. Docket (CCH)
1122, 1133 n.38 (1992)), the Task Force believes, as previously indicated, that, because a
consideration of the need to protect the public from the likelihood of future wrongdoing is
common to each of these contexts, the carefully developed standards applied in the fraud
and injunctive relief contexts (as well as the similar standards applied in the other contexts
discussed below) provide a model for the imposition of sanctions in the Rule I 02(e) context.

HeinOnline -- 52 Bus. Law. 978 1996-1997

Task Force on Rule 102(e) Proceedings

979

CENSURES, SUSPENSIONS, AND BARS FROM ASSOCIATION
WITH A BROKER-DEALER
Under the Exchange Act, the Commission may censure, suspend, or
bar a person from associating with a broker-dealer or place limitations on
the activities or functions of such person, if the Commission finds that the
person engaged in specified misconduct and that a sanction would serve
the public interest. 50 The Commission recently took the position that the
purpose of this provision is not to punish a person for past misconduct, but
rather to protect the public from persons who are currently unfit and pose
a threat to the public:

[T] he purpose of this proceeding is not to punish past misconduct
but to protect the public from future harm by unfit persons. Commission proceedings under §§ 15(b) and 19(h) are meant to assure the
integrity and competence of the securities industry professionals on
whom public investors rely. Evidence of past misconduct is relevant
in such a proceeding to the extent it sheds light on current fitness and
likely future behavior.5 1
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in]ohnson
v. SEC provides a clear articulation of the standards applied in determining
whether an individual should be suspended or barred from association
with a broker-dealer. 52 The issue in Johnson was whether an order censuring
and suspending a broker-dealer's branch manager from acting as a supervisor for six months should be deemed a civil penalty or a remedial sanction. 53 In arguing that the order imposing the censure and suspension was
not a civil penalty, the Commission recognized that the test for whether a
license suspension or revocation is punitive or remedial is whether the
suspension or revocation is for the "purpose of punishing past misconduct"
or "is based on present unfitness." 54 The Commission argued that the
50. Exchange Act§ 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6) (1994).
51. See SEC Brief, supra note 20, at 4. The Commission also stated that "[t]he overarching
purpose of these provisions, as reflected in the public interest requirement, is to protect the
public from persons who are professionally unfit." !d. at 22.
52. 87 F. 3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Following this decision, the Commission filed a motion
for an en bane hearing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which denied the
motion. The Solicitor General of the United States subsequently refused to give the Commission permission to seek certiorari.
53. This characterization was relevant for the purposes of determining whether the Commission's action was timely commenced because 28 U.S. C. § 2462 provides a five-year limitations period for proceedings brought to enforce any "civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise."
54. See In re]ohnson, Exchange Act Release No. 35,698, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) '1!85,624, at 86,617 (May 10, 1995) (determining that "[t]he proceeding
before us does not seek to impose a civil penalty, but rather to determine the appropriate
remedial action. The intent ofjohnson's suspension is to protect the public from future harm
at her hands"); see also SEC Brief, supra note 20, at 4.
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suspension of Ms. Johnson was remedial because it was rooted in her
present unfitness.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that
the order imposing the censure and suspension on Ms. Johnson was a
penalty. 55 In particular, the court objected to the lack of evidence demonstrating Ms. Johnson's present unfitness, noting that the order imposing
the censure and suspension "would less resemble punishment if the SEC
had focused on Johnson's current competence or the degree of risk she
posed to the public."56 Thus, both the Commission and the court seemed
to agree that a truly remedial suspension or bar would be based on present
unfitness, and the court further suggested that past misconduct alone
would be insufficient to demonstrate that unfitness.57 The Commission's
view in this context is entirely consistent with the view it holds with regard
to suspensions and bars of officers and directors.

OFFICER AND DIRECTOR SUSPENSIONS AND BARS
Under section 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and
Exchange Act section 21 (d)(2), 58 a federal court may suspend or bar a
defendant from serving as an officer or director of a public company at
the Commission's request where the court finds that (i) the defendant has
violated either Securities Act section 17(a)(l) or Exchange Act section
10(b), and (ii) the defendant's "conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness
to serve as an officer or director." 59 The Commission obtained explicit
statutory authority to seek court orders suspending or barring individuals
from serving as officers and directors of public companies with the enactment of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform
Act of 1990.60 In testifying in support of the suspension or bar authority,
then-Commission Chairman Richard Breeden told Congress that the
Commission would seek the remedy "only in those cases ... that involve
egregious fraudulent conduct."61
55. Johnson, 87 E3d at 491-92.
56. /d. at 489.
57. Cj Steadman v. SEC, 603 E2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979), qff'd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981)
(stating that "[i] t would be a gross abuse of discretion to bar an investment adviser from the
industry on the basis of isolated negligent violations").
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2).
59. !d.
60. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, § 101, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t).
61. The Securities Law on Eriforcement Remedies qf 1989: Hearing Bifore the Subcomm. on Sees. qf
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Aifoirs, lO l st Con g. 29 (1990) (statement of
Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
The report of the so-called "Treadway Commission," issued in October 1987, made the
initial recommendation that Congress grant the Commission the authority to suspend or bar
corporate officers and directors. See generally SEC, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (Oct. 1987). In written testimony to Congress
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The first courts to consider whether an officer should be suspended or
barred under these provisions have applied a list of factors first enunciated
by Professor Jayne W Barnard in 1992:62 "(1) the 'egregiousness' of the
underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's 'repeat offender'
status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the fraud;
(4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake
in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur. "63

OTHER AUTHORITIES REGULATING THE
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES OF ACCOUNTANTS
A "substantial unfitness" standard would not operate in a vacuum. A
variety of other public and private entities regulate both the accounting
profession and the professionalism of licensed accountants. These entities
have procedures in place for policing the accounting profession and systems designed to ensure the integrity of accountants practicing before the
Commission. 64
regarding the genesis of the idea, former SEC Commissioner James Treadway, who chaired
the Treadway Commission, stated:
First, the independent auditor, who in (the Treadway] Commission's view is secondarily
responsible for accurate financial statements is subject to bars and suspensions. \·Vhy, we
asked, should those with primary responsibility-management of the issuer- be subject
to lesser sanctions? Second, when you survey the field of those subject to the SEC's
reach who are subject to bars and suspensions-broker dealers and those associated
with them, investment companies and those associated with them, independent accountants and those associated with them, and professionals practicing before the
SEC-why is it that officers and directors of reporting companies are not subject to
the same sanctions?

Securities Law Enforcement Hearing Bifore the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin. qf the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 975, JOist Gong. 99 (1989) (statement of James C.
Treadway, Comm'r, SEC). The Task Force believes that, while officers and directors of public
companies are now subject to the same sanctions, the standards applied by the Commission
in determining whether an officer or director should be barred and whether an auditor should
be barred remain unjustifiably different.
62. J ayne W Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve?", 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1489, 1492-93 (1992).
63. SEC v. Shah, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,374, at
90,592 (S.D.N.Y July 28, 1993); see also SEC v. Patel, 61 F. 3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (approving the application of these factors in making "the unfitness assessment"). These factors
are largely based on those applied in determining whether to grant the Commission an
injunction against future violations of the federal securities laws, as well as those factors
discussed in Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979).
64. As Congress recently observed in the legislative history of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
The Conference Committee expects that the SEC will continue its long-standing practice of looking to the private sector to set and to improve auditing standards. The SEC
should not act to "modify" or "supplement" generally accepted auditing standards for
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AICPA REGULATION
Since 1977, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) has administered a quality control and peer review program for
members of its SEC Practice Section (Section). Members of the Section
include most of the firms nationwide that audit " SEC clients," the Section's term for companies making an initial filing under the Securities Act
or any registrant that files periodic reports with the Commission under the
Exchange Act (except brokers or dealers registered only because of section
l5(a) of the Exchange Act). The Section has established the Quality Control Inquiry Committee, which investigates specific allegations concerning
the professional conduct of Section members in auditing SEC clients. In
addition, the Section's Peer Review Program examines selected audits to
determine whether they were conducted properly and in accordance with
the firm 's and the profession's quality control standards. If the Section's
Peer Review Committee finds that an audit was not done in accordance
with GAAS or that financial statements were not prepared in accordance
with GAAP, the firm is expected to take appropriate corrective action. If
the firm does not do so, the Section's Executive Committee is empowered
to impose sanctions, which have included: (i) corrective measures by the
firm, including measures involving personnel; (ii) additional continuing
professional education; (iii) accelerated or special peer reviews; (iv) admonishments, censures, or reprimands; (v) suspension from membership
in the Section; or (vi) expulsion from Section membership.
Finally, all members of the AICPA are subject to that organization's
Code of Professional Conduct (Code). Members found to have violated
any of the rules contained, or any standards referred to, in the Code may
be subject to sanction; the maximum sanction is expulsion from membership. Expulsion from AICPA or a state CPA society membership, however,
has no effect on the person's license to practice as an accountant.65

GOVERNMENT REGULATION
State Licensing Authorities
Every state and U.S. territory has some form of licensing authority that
governs the certification or licensing of public accountants within its jurisdiction. These authorities may, in compliance with applicable procedures,
suspend or revoke the license of an accountant who fails to meet that state's
standards of conduct. Typical grounds for disciplinary actions against ac-

SEC registra nts until after it has determined that the private sector is unable or unwilling
to do so on a timely basis.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 47-48 (1995).
65 . DENZIL Y. CAUSEY, jR. & SANDRA A. CAUSEY, DUT IES AND LIABIUTIES OF PUBUC
ACCOUNTANTS 78 (5th ed. 1995).
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countants include "gross negligence,"66 "unprofessional conduct,"6 7 "discreditable conduct,"68 "dishonesty in the practice of public accounting," 69
prior suspension before a governmental body or agency, 70 failure to comply
with GAAS,71 or conviction of a crime. 72
Proceedings to suspend or revoke an accountant's license must afford
the licensee at least minimum due process. A person facing license revocation must have access to all documents considered by the hearing officer
and licensing board, for example,7 3 and must be provided "a definite
charge, adequate notice, and a full, fair and impartial hearing." 74 Typically,
judicial review is available.

Other Commission Sanctions Applicable to Accountants
The Commission has a number of enforcement measures available that
it can apply to accountants whose conduct it determines warrants the
imposition of sanctions. These measures demonstrate that the Commission
has great flexibility to address conduct that it deems objectionable. For
example, the Commission may issue orders requiring a respondent to cease
and desist from violating now, or in the future, any provision of the federal

66. Eisenberg v. Educ. Dep't, 510 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (App. Div. 1986) (revoking an accountant's license where, in auditing a company with poor records and no internal controls,
he failed to prepare an audit program or submit an internal control questionnaire).
67. Preusch v. University of N.Y., 490 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929 (App. Div. 1985) (confirming
determination to revoke an accountant's license where he orchestrated a client's loans to
companies in which he had a financial interest).
68. Gurry v. Board of Pub. Accountancy, 474 N.E.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Mass. 1985) (affirming two-year suspension and holding that statutory language was sufficiently specific to withstand constitutional challenge).
69. Arnold v. Board of Accountancy, 619 P.2d 912, 913-17 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming
revocation of an accountant's license where he overcharged clients and falsified billings);
Keene v. Board of Accountancy, 894 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming
revocation of license where accountant: (i) induced an elderly client to make a loan to the
accountant's corporation, (ii) made an unsecured loan of the client's money to a friend of the
accountant, and (iii) withdrew funds from the client's account without informing the client).
70. Compare Clare v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481, 485-89 (Ct. App.
1992) (affirming license suspension based on prior suspension by Federal Home Loan Bank
Board), with Thomas v. Board of Accountancy, 702 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)
(reversing revocation of the petitioner's license where he had been disbarred).
71. Christensen v. Wyoming Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 838 P.2d 723, 725-28
(Wyo. 1992) (affirming reprimand).
72. Ashe v. Department of Prof'! Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 467 So. 2d 814, 81415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming revocation of an accountant's certificate where he
had been convicted of trafficking in false and forged securities).
73. Christiansen v. Missouri State Bd. of Accountancy, 764 S.W.2d 952, 953-57 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (reversing revocation of an accountant's license for failure of board to make
documents available to accountant).
74. WILLIAM OTIS MORRIS, REVOCATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSES BY GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 66 ( 1984).
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securities laws. 75 The Commission may also order a respondent to comply
or take steps to effect compliance with provisions of the federal securities
laws upon such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify. Moreover, the Commission may seek a federal court
order enjoining violations of the federal securities laws. 76 If a defendant
profited from his or her misconduct, the Commission may seek a federal
court order requiring such person to disgorge any profit obtained as a
result of the violation, 77 and, in addition, may also seek from the federal
court the imposition of civil penalties against the defendant. 78

SANCTIONS IMPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
It is not uncommon for courts in criminal cases to condition the availability of probation on the defendant's willingness to forego certain types
of employment or to disengage himself from a particular working environment. Where the defendant is an accountant and has been convicted
of a crime, it may be appropriate for a court to condition the availability
of probation on the defendant's agreement to wind up his accounting
business and to refrain from performing general accounting services for
the term of his probation. This condition was imposed by the trial judge
and upheld by the appellate court in State v. Graham, 79 a case in which the
75. The Commission may enter an administrative cease-and-desist order against: (i) any
person that is, was, or is about to violate any provision of the federal securities laws; and (ii)
any person "that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the
person knew or should have known would contribute to such violation." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 7h-l (a) (1994). The legislative history of the Remedies Act, by which the Commission was
granted the authority to enter such cease-and-desist orders, noted that it would be appropriate
for the Commission to use the cease-and-desist remedy against persons "who commit isolated
infractions and present a lesser threat to investors," and to avoid protracted litigation or
settlement negotiations resulting from concerns regarding the severe collateral consequences
that arise from an injunction. S. REP. No. 101-337 (1990); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-616
(1990).
76. The most frequently invoked provision is 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d), which authorizes the
Commission to bring an action in district court "[w]henever it shall appear ... that any
person is engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute ... a
violation of the [Exchange Act] or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder." See also id.
§§ 77t(b), 79r(e), 80a-4l(d), 80b-9(d), 77uuu.
77. See, e.g., SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993); SEC v. First City Fin.
Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
78. For example, for insider trading and tipping cases, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 authorized the Commission to seek, and the courts to impose, a penalty of up to
three times the profit gained or loss avoided. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified at
15 U.S. C. § 78u-l (a)). For all other violations of the federal securities laws, the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 authorized the Commission
to seek, and the courts to impose, civil penalties on a natural person of up to $100,000 or, if
greater, the gross gain to the defendant. Pub. L. No. I 01-429, § I 0 I, I 04 Stat. 931 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)).
79. State v. Graham, 633 N.E.2d 622, 624-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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defendant-accountant had sold unregistered securities to several of his clients. Similar conditions to probation may be imposed in other circumstances, creating the practical effect of a temporary suspension of the accountant's license.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE TASK FORCE
The Task Force believes that the test for deciding whether to impose a
censure, suspension, or bar pursuant to Rule 102(e) for improper professional conduct on independent public accountants should be a determination of whether the accountant presents a current threat of future misconduct harmful to the Commission's processes.BO We believe the existing
regime regarding officer and director suspensions and bars and suspensions and bars from association with broker-dealers provides the appropriate model for this determination. Each of these types of suspensions
and bars prevents a person from pursuing a particular livelihood in the
future, prohibiting activities that go beyond the dealings with the particular
business entity that gave rise to the sanctions, indeed, prohibiting what
would otherwise be Legal conduct. Given these similarities, we believe that
the application of differing standards by which accountants may be sanctioned cannot be justified. The application of similar standards in the Rule
l02(e) context would provide consistency, predictability, and results far
superior to that which has been the case in recent years, and which has
raised so much understandable concern.
Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that the Commission impose
a Rule l02(e) sanction for improper professional conduct only upon a
finding by the Commission that the accountant is presently "substantially
unfit" to practice before the Commission. While we believe that the Commission is justified in expressing concern regarding instances of past negligent conduct by accountants, we believe that, in determining whether to
impose a Rule l02(e) sanction on an accountant, the Commission must
consider much more than the mere existence of past negligent conduct.
Rather, we believe that a finding of "substantial unfitness" requires that
the Commission examine the accountant's alleged misconduct, subsequent
behavior, and current circumstances.
Specifically, the Commission ought to consider and expressly discuss the
egregiousness of the underlying conduct, whether the conduct involved an
isolated failure or was part of a continuing pattern of misconduct, the
80. Many public companies employ accountants to prepare the financial statements that
the company files with the Commission. A Rule I 02(e) sanction, as applied to such employees,
is a de facto form of regulation of employees of public companies. The imposition of such a
de facto officer and director bar is suspect, especially in light of the 1990 statutory provision
pursuant to which the Commission must seek federal court approval to impose a bar against
service as an officer or director of a publicly held company. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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accountant's "role" or position when he or she engaged in the conduct,
the accountant's degree of scienter, and the accountant's economic stake
in the violation.81 These issues must be evaluated in light of the likelihood
of the misconduct to recur. In this regard, the Commission should take
into account such factors as: (i) where appropriate, whether the accountant
has pursued educational measures to correct deficiencies in his or her
conduct; (ii) whether the accountant's employer has disciplined the accountant; (iii) whether there is heightened firm supervision of the accountant; (iv) whether the accountant has engaged in additional misconduct;
and (v) the current employment status of the accountant.
The Task Force believes that focusing on these factors will, in general,
eliminate the concern shared by many ethical, competent accountants that
a single act or judgment, deemed not to comply with professional standards (and, therefore, arguably negligent) by the Commission, could cause
them to lose their ability to engage in their profession. Accountants often
audit numerous public companies in a single year, and each audit is fraught
with numerous procedures and judgment calls:
an audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that . ..
can be easily checked against uniform standards of indisputable accuracy. Rather, an audit report is a professional opinion based on
numerous and complex factors ... . The report is based on the auditor's interpretation and application of hundreds of professional
standards, many of which are broadly phrased and readily subject to
different constructions. Although ultimately expressed in shorthand
form, the report is the final product of a complex process involving
discretion and judgment on the part of the auditor at every stage.
Using different initial assumptions and approaches, different sam-

81. These factors are largely based on those discussed in Steadman, where the owner of an
investment adviser appealed the Commission's imposition of an order permanently barring
him from associating with any investment adviser or affiliating with any registered investment
company. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit held
that, when the Commission imposes the most drastic sanctions at its disposal, it must articulate carefully the grounds for its decision. In that context, the court observed, "[t)o say that
past misconduct gives rise to an inference of future misconduct is not enough. What is
required is a specific enumeration of the factors in Steadman's case that merit permanent
exclusion." ld. Among the factors that the court held the Commission should specifically
consider are:
the egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent nature of the
infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant's assurances
against future violations, the defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present opportunities for
future violations.

!d. (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 n.29 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
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piing techniques, and the wisdom of20-20 hindsight, few CPA audits
would be immune from criticism. 82
In short, even competent and ethical accountants may engage at least once
in conduct that, in retrospect, could be viewed as negligent. 83 Even though
an accountant who engages in this kind of conduct presents a substantially
different situation than that presented by an accountant whose conduct
poses a continuing and immediate threat to the Commission's processes,
the standards currently applied by the Commission fail to distinguish these
two situations. This failure has been among the significant reasons for the
concerns raised in recent years regarding the imposition of Rule I 02(e)
sanctions on accountants.
Reserving Rule I 02(e) sanctions for accountants whom the Commission
finds to be presently substantially unfit and, therefore, posing a current
threat of future misconduct harmful to the Commission's processes is especially appropriate in light of rhe severe impact a Rule 102(e) sanction
imposes on an accountant. A Rule 102(e) finding that an accountant has
engaged in "improper professional conduct" can substantially impede the
efforts of the individual to continue with his or her career (or, for that
matter, make a fresh start in another field of endeavor). 84
82. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 763 (Cal. 1992) (en bane); see also John A.
Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits if Instrumental Tort Riform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929,
1962 n.l58 (1988) (stating that "modern audits of complex enterprises require accountants
to make numerous judgments about the proper characterizations of the data and the reliability of the client's accounting systems"); James F. Strother, The Establishment if Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND. L. REV. 20 I, 20 I
( 1975) ("The complexity of generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted
auditing standards is belied, and perhaps obscured, by their familiar acronyms.... ").
83. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F. 3d 452, 4 79 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (''Accounting principles
must be interpreted. Judgments must be made about specific transactions. '[R]easonable
preparers of financial statements'-often management-'and auditors can disagree about
those interpretations and judgments.'") (quoting JERRY D. SULUVAl'\1 ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 19 (10th ed. 1985)) (opinion of Randolph, CJ.).
84. While the Task Force believes there must be a threshold test for the imposition ofRule
I 02(e) sanctions, the Task Force suggests that once the criteria for the imposition of a Rule
I 02(e) sanction are met, the Commission should consider structuring Rule I 02(e) sanctions
in light of a respondent's particular deficiencies. The Commission currently imposes censures,
suspensions, or bars designed to address specific circumstances. In addition, the Commission
might consider the possibility that a respondent who has demonstrated unfitness in a specific
area could, through education and training, correct his or her unfitness. Thus, if a respondent
is deemed to be substantially unfit to practice as an accountant because the respondent has
demonstrated an inadequate understanding of GAAS, then the Commission might consider
limiting the respondent's practice before the Commission as an independent public accountant unless he or she is adequately supervised or until he or she has undertaken training and
education in the requirements of GAAS. A respondent who understands GAAP but has an
inadequate appreciation of GAAS, however, should not be precluded from participating in
the preparation of financial statements as, for example, a member of the finance and accounting
department of a public company, as opposed to having ultimate responsibility for the application if the auditing standards to those financial statements.
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Moreover, Rule l 02(e)'s continued viability is open to renewed, and
perhaps fatal, challenge if the Commission determines to rely on isolated
negligent conduct as a predicate for the initiation of Rule l 02(e) proceedings. Such a course may provide a strong basis for challenging the validity
of particular sanctions, and the Rule itself, as not "reasonably related" to
the purposes of the federal securities Jaws. 85 The federal courts have previously signaled their receptivity to such a challenge to Rule l 02(e). As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed in Davy: "We do not
consider whether cases can arise in which the SEC in Rule 2(e) matters
exceeds its proper jurisdictional boundaries. The precise reach of the SEC
in these situations has not been defined and we leave that task for a future
case which implicates that question directly."8 6 Under these circumstances,
the Commission's efforts to impose Rule 102(e) sanctions would also be
frustrated if a higher proportion of Rule 102(e) proceedings were litigated
and appealed, rather than settled.

CONCLUSION
As a matter of policy, the Commission should administer Rule l02(e) in
light of its remedial purpose and require that Rule l 02(e) sanctions not be
imposed unless the entire record, including the respondent's overall professional qualifications, experience, and conduct, demonstrates that the
respondent is presently substantially unfit to practice before the Commission and, therefore, poses a current threat of future misconduct harmful
to the Commission's processes. Although the consideration of these factors
in determining whether an accountant engaged in "improper professional
conduct" may be viewed by some as restricting the Commission's Rule
l02(e) authority, in fact, the Task Force believes that such a clarification
of the standard applied by the Commission will confirm and add legitimacy to such authority, and is entirely appropriate given the need for at
least minimal due process when a person's livelihood is at stake. 87 Such a
85. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
86. D avy v. SEC, 792 F2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986). As previously discussed, Judge
Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit made a similar observation in
his opinion in Checkosky:
If the Commission were to determine that an accountant's negligence is a per seviolation
of Rule 2(e), it would have to consider not only the administrative burden such a position
would entail but also whether it would constitute a de facto substantive regulation of the
profession and thus raise questions as to the legitimacy of Rule 2(e)(l)(ii)-or at least its
scope.

Checkosky, 23 F. 3d at 459 (opinion of Silberman, CJ.).
87 . Although not the subject of this report, we note that the Commission already has
imposed restrictions on its ability to initiate Rule 102(e) proceedings against lawyers. See
Disciplinary Proceedings Release, supra note 16 (stating that Rule 102(e) proceedings against
lawyers are " a vehicle for protecting the Commission against further practice by attorneys
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direct focus on professional fitness would better serve to protect the investing public, would better tailor the use of remedial sanctions to circumstances of particular professionals, is consistent with the Commission's mission, and would be far more likely than a "past negligence" standard to
pass judicial muster.

who have been the subject of other judicial or administrative proceedings involving securities
law violations"). The practice of premising Rule I 02(e) proceedings on judicial orders was
questioned when the U.S. Supreme Court eliminated the viability of the primary means by
which lawyers had been sanctioned: aiding and abetting a Rule I Ob-5 violation. See Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994);
Simon M. Lorne, Securities and Exchange Commission Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Lawyers After Central Bank, Address to the 27th Annual Securities Regulation Seminar
(Oct. 3, 1994) ("With the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Bank, the Commission's options in cases involving lawyers may have been narrowed to an extent that raises
vexing questions."). This objection was eliminated in 1995 when Congress reinstated the
Commission's authority to prosecute aiding and abetting violations of the Exchange Act. See
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 756
( 1995) (codified at I 5 U.S. C. § 78t(Q (Supp. I I 995)); see also SEC Commissioner Norman S.
Johnson , Remarks before the Committee on Federal Regulation ofSecurities of the American
Bar Association's Section of Business Law (Nov. 8, I 996) (confirming the continued viability
of this approach) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
In this regard, however, it should be noted that the Commission has a statutory anchor for
the regulation of accounting practices which it does not have in connection with the regulation of the practice of law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994) (stating that the Commission
has the authority to "de fin [e] accounting, technical and trade terms used in this title"); id.
§ 77aa(25), (26) (stating that balance sheets and profit and loss statements filed as part of a
registration statement shall be "in such detail and such form as the Commission shall prescribe"); id. § 78«b)(l)ffi, (K) (stating that balance sheets and profit and loss statements filed
as part of an application for registration on a national securities exchange shall be "in such
detail" as the Commission may require); id. § 78m(b)(l) (stating that the Commission may
prescribe " methods to be followed" in preparation of accounting reports). In a Commission
release, the Commission expressly distinguished the authority it exercises under Rule l02(e)
with regard to accountants from that which it exercises with regard to lawyers:
The Commission has express statutory authority under the federal securities laws to
prescribe the requirements for financial statements that have been filed with the Commission. Expertise to determine whether these standards have been properly applied is
a corollary of that power.
With respect to attorneys, the Commission generally has not sought to develop or
apply independent standards of professional conduct .... [I]he Commission, as a matter of policy, generally refrains from using its administrative forum to conduct de novo
determinations of the professional obligations of attorneys.
Disciplinary Proceedings Release, supra note I 6, at 89,244.
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